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obligation of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00), equal to
Plaintiff/Respondent's obligation to indicate their obligation
to pay to Plaintiff/Respondent the amount he was paying to his
credit union on the mobile home (page 19).

Several documents

were exchanged by the parties in this transaction.
Chattel Mortgage
Bill of Sale
Real Estate Contract
Note to American Heritage
Note from American Heritage

Page
Page
Page
Page
Page

They were:
27
26,27
25
25
19

These documents were reviewed by the parties at the closing (page

16,18) and all documents showed American Heritage Builders, Inc.
as one party and Plaintiff/Respondent as the other (page 29).
There was no request by Plaintiff/Respondent nor discussion
between the parties that Defendant/Appellant act as guarantor of
the note or that he should sign personally (page 29,30,34).
Plaintiff/Respondent said he couldn't recall if he knew he was
dealing with a corporation.
wife (page 36).

He left all those details to his

Wife of Plaintiff/Respondent said she knew

they were dealing with American Heritage Builders, Inc.

(page 59).

Subsequently, American Heritage Builders, Inc. fell into hard
times and failed to make some of the payments as agreed (page 71 •
Suit was brought against American Heritage Builders, Inc. and
Larry Sorenson and judgment was rendered against American Heritage
Builders, Inc.

(page 46).

Plaintiff/Respondent recovered mobile

home at sheriff's sale (page 47) and resold the mobile home,
paid off the note that he owed to the credit union and recovered
Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) for himself (page 50).

The

mobile home was out of Plaintiff/Respondent's possession from
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oecember 1973 to January 1977, or a total of approximately
three years, and during that time, American Heritage Builders,
Inc. missed only five payments until the suit was filed, for
a total of Nine Hundred and Forty Five Dollars ($945.00)
38, 39).

(page

Action was continued on the note and judgment was

rendered in favor of Plaintiff/Respondent and against Defendant/
Appellant for the amount of the note.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT SIGNED NOTE AS OFFICER OF

CORPORATION AND NOT IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, NOR AS
GUARANTOR.
Five documents were exchanged between the parties at the
time of the transaction, which gave rise to the note complained
of below, the note being one of the documents.

All of the

documents showed American Heritage Builders, Inc. as one party
with Defendant/Appellant Sorenson signing as an officer of
said corporation and with Plaintiff/Respondent Kiniry as one
of the other parties.

Only one document, the note given

from American Heritage Builders, Inc. to Plaintiff/Respondent
is in any way ambiguous.

In First Bank & Trust Company v

Post, 12 UCC Reporting Service 512, the Illinois Appellate
Court handled a similar fact situation.

In this matter,

the defendants signed two documents, a chattel mortgage security agreement and a chattel mortgage note.

The chattel

mortgage security agreement granted to the Plaintiff, a security

-3-
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interest in a lathe as collateral for the loan.

On the security

agreement, the words "Palatine Welding Sales and Manufacturing,
Inc." were hand written, once at the top left of the document
and again on the first line provided for signatures with the
defendant's signatures beneath.

The chattel mortgage note

did not bear the name of the corporation.

In the area provided

for the signatures the names of the three defendants appeared
with no designation of either the person represented or their
representative capacity.

The plaintiff in this matter argued

that the court should affirm the judgment of the trial court
by giving him judgment against the officers of the corporation.
The court answered in part as follows:

"Second, the note and

security agreement were executed contemporaneously and as
part of the same transaction and concerned the same subject
matter and therefore, should be construed together ... The
security agreement clearly shows that the corporation, Palatine
Welding Sales & Manufacturing Company, Inc. was a party to
this loan transaction.

The note appears to be signed by the

defendants, personally, but the reverse side bears a guarantee
wherein the same persons personally guarantee their own signatures, a seemingly senseless redundancy.

When construed together

the form of these instruments fairly indicates to the eye of
common sense that the makers intended to sign the face of the
note as officers of the corporation."
If the documents exchanged as part of the transaction
in this matter, in addition to the note complained of, are all
construed together with the note, there can be no doubt that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the intent of the parties was that the transaction was between
American Heritage Builders, Inc. and Plaintiff/Respondent as
the parties with Defendant/Appellant signing.for the corporation
as an agent and in his corporate capacity and not as guarantor
nor in any personal capacity.
Testimony before the Court below by Defendant/Appellant
was that he never intended to sign in an individual capacity,
but only in his representative capacity as an agent of the
corporation.

The testimony of Plaintiff/Respondent was that

he didn't recall any conversation about the existence of the
corporation.

There was not testimony to indicate the intent,

desire or understanding by either party that Defendant/Appellant
Sorenson signed in an individual capacity nor as guarantor.
In Speer v Friedland, 12 UCC Reporting Service 509, the
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, had to decide
a matter in which the question of the capacity in which an individual signed a check was raised.

In this matter, the Court

quoted the Uniform Commercial Code §3-403, which is contained
in Utah Code Annotated in §70-A-3-403, which provides in part
that "(2) an authorized representative who signs his own name
to an instrument:
(a) Is personally obligated if the instrument neither
names the pe~son represented nor shows that the representative
signed in a representative cap~city;
(b) Except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the
person represented, but does not show that the representative
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signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does
not name the person represented but does show that the representative signed in the representative capacity."
the Court held as follows:

In this matter,

"In the case sub judice, the check

signed by Appellant was ambiguous on its face as to whether
she had signed as a co-maker or in a representative capacity.
Parol evidence was therefore adrnissable to show the intention
of the parties.
Appellant testified that she never intended to sign
the check in question in an individual capacity, but that she
signed it in her representative capacity, which she had authority
to do.

Appel lee produced no evidence to controvert this testimony.

The prsumption that she signed in a personal capacity was overcome by the manifest weight of the evidence.

The burden then

shifted to Appellee to prove the issue by preponderance of the
evidence, unaided by the presumption, which he failed to do."
In the present case, we have a similar set of facts in
that the testimony of Defendant/Appellant is very clear that
there is no intention on his part to sign in any individual
capacity.

He also testifies that there was no request or dis-

cussion of his signing in any such personal capacity.

Plaintiff/

Respondent in his testimony, does not claim that Defendant/Appellant
signed in his personal capacity or as a guarantor, nor that he
requested that he do so, nor that he understood that he did so.
His testimony is only that he did not recall a discussion concerning the fact that one of the parties to the transaction was
a corporation.

It seems obvious that in this matter the Plaintiff/
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Respondent has failed to prove the issue by a preponderance
of the evidence unaided by any presumption in law.
The parol evidence submitted to the Court below, was
properly admitted because the note in question was ambiguous
under the terms of §70-A-3-403 Utah Code Annotated.
In J.P. Sivertson & Company v. Lolmaugh, 24

ucc

Reporting

Service 1212, the Court had to decide whether or not to allow
such parol evidence.
facts as follows:

In this matter, the Court summarized the

"On October 26, 1973, the defendant executed

a promissory note to the plaintiff.

The note was a demand note

for $2,761.72 at 7% percent interest.
the note in the following manner.

The defendant signed

On the first line he wrote

the letters, "L.T.G. De.", and then on the next line immediately
below the letters, the defendant affixed his signature."

The

Court recited §3-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which we
have already cited in pertinent part and then held that "First
the action must be between the immediate parties to the note.
Secondly, there must be some indication of the existence of a
principal or that the signator signed in a representative
capacity."

In the fact situation here, the Court held "The

fact that the defendant wrote the letters above his signature
is a clear indication that they were intended to authenticate
the note by naming 'the person represented.'"

The Court further

held that the two elements required to allow parol evidence
was present and that therefore the parol evidence was properly
admitted below.

In the present matter, the typewritten name

of the corporation, American Heritage Builders, Inc. was placed
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above the signature of Defendant/Appellant Sorenson, being a
clear indication that the name American Heritage Builders, Inc.
was intended to authenticate the note by naming the person
representative and giving clear notice to Plaintiff/Respondent
that the document was a corporate document.
POINT II:

THE RECOVERY, BY PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,

OF THE MOBILE HOME, WHICH WAS THE UNDERLYING OBLIGATION
OF THE NOTE, TERMINATED ALL LIABILITY UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE NOTE.
In this matter, the note was given to show that American
Heritage Builders, Inc. took possession of the mobile home and
assumed the obligation to pay to Plaintiff/Respondent, the
amount deducted from his paycheck and paid over to Cyprus Credit
Union as payment for the mobile home.

Plaintiff/Respondent did

not have legal title, only an equitable title.

Cyprus Credit

Union retained title all through this course of affairs until
such time as Plaintiff/Respondent recovered the mobile home at
the sheriff's sale, resold it, satisfied the obligation to the
credit union and realized the sum of Three Thousand Dollars
($3,000.00) for himself in the transaction.
In Dulio v Senechal, 7 UCC Reporting Service 222, the
Massachusetts Appellate Division held that "The plaintiff has
obtained restitution by being restored to the position he formerly
occupied by the return of the 1959 Ford Sedan, which he formerly
had."

This was a case in which a credit union had issued a

check to a car dealer to pay for a car purchased by Senechal,
a credit union member, who had given the credit union his note
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

for the amount of the check.

Senechal took possession of the

car and gave the check to the dealer.

The credit union then

discovered that Senechal had lost his job so they stopped
payment on the check.

Senechal returned the car to the dealer,

but the dealer sued for payment of the check.

The court further

held that "The conclusion is warranted that the check in plaintiff's
possession had been satisfied and therefore that the Plaintiff may
not recover the amount thereof.

It is provided by G.L.c 106 §3-603

[70-A-3-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended] that (l}
the liability of any party is discharged to the extend of his
payment or satisfaction to the holder ... and (2) payment or
satisfaction may be made with the consent of the holder by any
person ..•• "

Chapter 8, §145 of the Restatment of the Law in the

Courts, Restitution, provides as follows:

A CAUSE OF ACTION

FOR RESTITUTION AGAINST ANOTHER IS TERMINATED BY ITS MERGER
IN A VALID JUDGMENT AGAINST THE OTHER, BASED UPON THE FACTS

ESTABLISHING THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RESTITUTION.
Comment:
a.

Where a person obtains a judgment in his favor, the

cause of action which he previously had is terminated by being
merged in the judgment, that is, the duty to return a benefit,
its value or proceeds, based upon the operative facts which led
to the judgment, is ended and a new duty is created based solely
upon the rendering of a judgment which is the crystalization
and specific definition of the preceding duty.

This rule results

from the desirability of not having two distinct claims against
one person, based upon the same operative facts, existing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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simultaneously.

Where a person has alternate remedies to sue,

either in tort or in an action for restitution and has pursued
one of these remedies to judgment, since the judgment terminates
the right, it terminates also the unused remedy.
b.

In an action for the conversion of a chattel, a

judgment for its value, until satisfied, does not transfer the
title of a chattel to the judgment debtor, and, hence, the
judgment creditor is entitled to regain a chattel thereafter at
the expense, however, of losing his right to enforce the judgment.
Illustration:
a.

A converts B's horse.

A in an action for conversion.

B obtains a judgment against

B regains the horse without the

use of force or a trespass on A's land.

B is entitled to retain

the horse, but not to enforce the judgment.
Section 147 of Chapter 8, Restatement, Restitution, in
Subsection (3) provides as follows:

OBTAINING FULL SATISFACTION

OF A JUDGMENT EITHER FOR DAMAGES OR FOR RESTITUTION AGAINST ONE
OF TWO PERSONS SEVERALLY UNDER A DUTY OF RESTITUTION WITH
REFERENCE TO THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER, TERMINATES THE RIGHT TO
MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST, OR TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION FROM, THE
OTHER.
Comment on Subsection (3):
d.

Where a claim against two persons is founded upon a

single deprivation as it is where a tort resulting in a single
harm has been committed by two persons concurrently or acting
in cooperation, the injured person, while having a cause of
action against each of the parties for the entire amount of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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injury, is entitled to only one satisfaction.

If he obtains

judgment against one and it is satisfied, he thereby loses his
claim against the other.

In the instant case, judgment has

been obtained against one of the parties to the lawsuit, American
Heritage Builders, Inc. and restitution has been had by the
recovery and resale, at a profit, to Plaintiff/Respondent of
the mobile home.

Under the cases cited and the Restatement of

the Law and of the Sections of Utah Code Annotated cited, it is
clear that Plaintiff/Respondent has been fully satisfied and
restored to his former condition and that he has no further
right under law or equity to pursue Defendant/Appellant for any
further judgment in this matter.

To so allow, would be uncon-

tionable and would unjustly enrich Plaintiff/Respondent.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant submits that he was not a party to
the note, and is not obligated under it, but that American
Heritage Builders, Inc. was the party to the note and that his
signature is only as an agent therefore.

Defendant/Appellant

further submits that the note has been satisfied by the recovery
of Plaintiff/Respondent of the mobile home and its resale and
Plaintiff/Respondent may not recover further.
Justice will best be served by reversing the decision of
the Lower Court.
Such action would be inconsistent with Utah Law, with
the decisions of the several courts in the cases cited, and with
the Restatement of the Law, Restitution.

-11-
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Such action would also prevent the unjust enrichment
of Plaintiff/Respondent and the unjust penalization of Defendant/
Appellant.
Respectfully Submitted,

N ROBERTSON
ney for Defendant/Appellant
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